The Cancellation of Debts in Shemitah

What Is the Cancellation of Debts

A debt over which the seventh year has passed may not be demanded; and if the borrower comes to repay it, the lender must say to him, “I release it.” According to most Rishonim, even if the lender did not say “I release it,” the debt is annulled.

The Source of the Law of the Cancellation of Debts

Regarding the mitzvah of the cancellation of debts, we find in the Torah one positive commandment and two negative commandments, as follows:

[a]. A positive commandment to cancel debts in the Shemitah year, as it is stated: “וְזֶה דְּבַר הַשְּׁמִטָּה שָׁמוֹט כָּל בַּעַל מַשֵּׁה יָדוֹ,” “וַאֲשֶׁר יִהְיֶה לְךָ אֶת אָחִיךָ תַּשְׁמֵט יָדֶךָ” — “And this is the matter of the release: every creditor shall release that which he has lent… and whatever you have with your brother, you shall release from your hand” (Devarim 15:2–3).

[b]. A negative commandment not to demand repayment of a debt over which Shemitah has passed, as it is stated: “לֹא יִגֹּשׂ אֶת רֵעֵהוּ וְאֶת אָחִיו” — “He shall not press his fellow or his brother” (ibid.).

[c]. A negative commandment not to refrain from lending to the needy out of concern that Shemitah will cancel the debt, as it is stated: “הִשָּׁמֶר לְךָ פֶּן יִהְיֶה דָבָר עִם לְבָבְךָ בְלִיַּעַל לֵאמֹר קָרְבָה שְׁנַת הַשֶּׁבַע שְׁנַת הַשְּׁמִטָּה...” — “Beware lest there be an unworthy thought in your heart, saying: The seventh year, the year of Shemitah, is approaching…” (Devarim 15:9).

The Laws of the Cancellation of Debts

In our time and outside Eretz Yisrael: According to Torah law, the cancellation of debts applies only when the Yovel applies; however, by rabbinic enactment, the cancellation of debts applies in our time everywhere, even outside Eretz Yisrael.

Women: Women are also obligated in this mitzvah; therefore an unmarried or married woman who has her own bank account must make a pruzbul.

A lender who transgressed and demanded payment: If the lender demands the debt, some say that even if the borrower ultimately did not pay, the very demand constitutes a violation of the prohibition. If the lender collected the debt, some say that in addition to the above prohibitions, the money he collected is considered stolen property in his possession.

Returning a debt that was canceled: The Sages said [Shevi’it 10:9], “One who returns a debt in the seventh year, the spirit of the Sages is pleased with him.” Therefore, even though the seventh year has passed, the borrower should go and repay his debt; and when the lender says to him, “I release it,” he should say, “Nevertheless, I wish to give it to you as a gift,” and then the lender may accept it from him.

When the lender says, “I release it,” he may say it in a weak tone, in a manner that hints to the borrower to say, “Nevertheless,” etc.

According to most poskim, one should not explicitly tell the borrower to say, “Nevertheless,” etc.; however, it is permitted to tell others that the borrower came to repay the money and that he responded to him, “I release it,” and they, on their own, may go to the borrower and tell him to say, “Nevertheless,” etc.

Does Shemitah Cancel at Its Beginning or at Its End?

The halachah is ruled (Choshen Mishpat, siman 67, se’if 30) in accordance with the view of most Rishonim, that the seventh year cancels monetary debts at its end, and there is no need to make a pruzbul until the end of the Shemitah year. However, the Acharonim wrote that it is proper to take into account the opinion of the Rosh (Gittin, ch. 4, siman 20), who maintains that the prohibition of demanding payment begins at the start of the Shemitah year; only that during the Shemitah year, if the borrower returns the debt on his own initiative, the lender may accept it and need not say, “I release it”[1].

An additional reason why it is proper to make a pruzbul before Rosh Hashanah of the Shemitah year is that some Rishonim are of the opinion that the Shemitah year is one year earlier than the time practiced according to our calendar today. Although the halachah is not so, regarding the cancellation of debts—which is a monetary matter—if the borrower were to make such a claim, it may be impossible to extract the money from him.

Even a person who made a pruzbul on the eve of the Shemitah year in order to satisfy the opinion of the Rosh must make an additional pruzbul at the end of the Shemitah year.

Debts for Purchases on Credit, Wages, and Rent

Introduction:
Debts for purchases on credit are not canceled [unless there was zekifah be-milveh, i.e., the debt was converted into the status of a loan]. The poskim dispute whether this rule applies only to debts in a grocery or vegetable store where they sell on credit and the usual practice is to pay only after several purchases, or whether it applies even to stores where people usually pay after each transaction but one bought from them on credit—whether debts to such stores are also not canceled by the seventh year, since the money was not given as a loan. This dispute depends on the opinions of the Rishonim below.

We learned in tractate Shevi’it [10:1]: “The seventh year cancels a loan whether documented by a contract or not documented by a contract. ‘Store credit’ is not canceled, but if he made it into a loan, it is canceled… ‘A worker’s wage’ is not canceled, but if he made it into a loan, it is canceled.”

Two approaches were stated in explaining why “store credit” and “a worker’s wage” are not canceled:

The first approach [the view of most Rishonim[2]] — only a loan is canceled, but a debt owed for a sale, for wages, or in any other manner is not canceled.

The second approach[3] — every debt is canceled, even if it arose through a sale, labor, or any other manner; and the reason “store credit” and “a worker’s wage” are not canceled is that in their time it was customary to buy on credit in a store for a long period and pay only when a very large sum had accumulated; likewise, it was customary to pay workers’ wages only after a large sum had accumulated. Thus, at the end of the Shemitah year the debt was not yet due for collection, and therefore it was not canceled.

There is a practical difference between these two reasons:

A monthly salary for a worker in our times, when it is customary

to pay after a short time: according to most Rishonim it is not canceled, since it is not a debt arising from a “loan,” whereas according to the Rambam it is canceled. Similarly, store credit in our times, when it is customary to pay once a month: according to most Rishonim it is not canceled [if there was no zekifah be-milveh], for this is included in the category of “store credit”; however, according to the Rambam it is canceled, since “store credit” mentioned in the Mishnah refers only to a case where at the conclusion of the Shemitah year the debt is not yet due for collection, whereas in our times the debt is due for collection.

Indeed, even in a case of “store credit,” if there was “zekifah be-milveh,” the debt is canceled [and this is the meaning of the Mishnah above, “but if he made it into a loan, it is canceled”]. What is “zekifah be-milveh”? We find many opinions about this, and will list some of them: the opinion of the Rosh (Gittin, ch. 4, siman 17) is that it means setting a time for repayment of the debt before Rosh Hashanah; and the opinion of the Mordechai (Shevuot 49a, remez 780) is that writing a summary of the entire debt together is considered zekifah be-milveh.

The practical halachic conclusion:

a. Wages owed to employees for their work are not canceled by the seventh year; but some maintain that their status is like a loan and the seventh year cancels them.

b. Debts for renting a house or a car are not canceled by the seventh year; but some maintain that their status is like loans and they are canceled.

c. Debts created as a result of obligations that a person undertook toward another [in a manner in which the obligation is effective according to halachah] are not canceled by the seventh year; but some maintain that their status is like loans and they are canceled.

d. Debts owed to a shadchan or broker are not canceled; but some maintain that their status is like loans and they are canceled.

e. If one bought in a store on credit, the debt is not canceled. Some say that its status is like a loan and the debt is canceled.

f. Where a purchase on credit is recorded in a computer, and with each purchase the total of all purchases made until that day is summed up, there is room to consider that this is deemed “zekifah.”

g. Debts to a telephone company or electric company are considered zekifah be-milveh, and the debt is canceled; therefore, if one received a notice to pay the debt before Rosh Hashanah, one should make sure to pay the debt by then.

[1] The wording of the Shulchan Aruch HaRav (Laws of Loans, siman 36) is: “Ideally, one should make a pruzbul on the eve of Rosh Hashanah,” and the wording of the Tumim (Choshen Mishpat, siman 67, se’if katan 26) is: “One should be stringent and make a pruzbul, and a God-fearing person will satisfy all opinions.”

[2] See Tosafot (Gittin 18a, s.v. מאימתי), Tosafot (Ketubot 55a, s.v. ולשביעית), and the Rishonim on Ketubot there; see Ramban and Ritva there, and Meiri (Gittin 37).

[3] The view of the Rambam according to the explanation of the Beit Yosef (Choshen Mishpat, siman 67), and in Kesef Mishneh (chapter 9 of the Laws of Shemitah and Yovel, halachah 11); and so it is ruled halachically in the Sma (se’if katan 26) and in Shulchan Aruch HaRav (Laws of Loans, se’if 39).

[4] There are three types of gemach funds:

A gemach fund for which the administrators of the gemach bear responsibility: that is, if there is no money in the fund [for example, because the borrowers have not repaid, etc.], and one of the depositors wants to withdraw the money he deposited, he can collect it from the personal money of the gemach administrator [this deposit is considered a loan from one person to another].

A gemach fund for which the gemach fund itself bears responsibility: that is, if there is no money, the depositor can collect his money from the equity of the gemach fund, and it cannot be claimed against him that the money he deposited in the past is now with the borrowers.

A gemach fund for which the depositor bears responsibility: that is, if there is no money, the depositor has lost his money, and the gemach fund need not pay the deposit from its own equity.

It requires examination what the law is when one deposited without specifying and did not agree with the fund who bears responsibility; and this is not the place to elaborate.

[5] Although the Or Sameach, chapter 9 of Shevi’it, halachah 18, was uncertain about the matter, in the glosses of Maharikash he permits it because it is not a judicial proceeding, and it may be done at night.

[6] Glosses of Maharikash, se’if 31; Responsa Teshuvah Me’Ahavah, vol. 1, siman 72; however, the Tumim, se’if katan 23, was uncertain about this, and according to the opinion of the Shulchan Aruch that a more distinguished beit din is required, one should be careful that they not be relatives.

[7] Some Rishonim maintain that the lender as well must have land (Responsa Mabit, vol. 1, siman 301).

[8] See Rashi and Tosafot in Gittin 37a, s.v. אלא על הקרקע, and also Rashi and Tosafot in Kiddushin 26b, s.v. לכתוב עליה פרוסבול, and also Rashi and Tosafot in Bava Batra (27a); and so wrote the Rashbam (Bava Batra 66) in the name of Rashi.

[9] One may ask against the view of Rashi and Tosafot, who wrote that the reason the borrower must have land is because the enactment of pruzbul was made for a common loan, and the usual practice is to lend only if the borrower has land, so that the lender will have from where to collect. According to this, it would emerge that the borrower must have land at the time of the loan, whereas the law is not so, and it is sufficient that he have land at the time of writing the pruzbul. It must be explained that the essence of the enactment of pruzbul concerns a “common loan,” and since at the time the pruzbul is written the borrower has land and the debt is common, the Sages did not distinguish, and a pruzbul may be written.

[10] This is obvious. This entire law applies specifically when the money belongs to them; however, if they received permission to lend their father’s money, they do not need to make a pruzbul, but rather their father does, because it is not their money.

[11] Money deposited in a bank account is considered a loan to the bank.

[12] A young man or young woman who received a gift from their parents or from others: according to many Rishonim (Bava Metzia 12), the money belongs to the young man or young woman, and so the Rema ruled halachically (Choshen Mishpat, siman 270, se’if 2). Therefore, they must make a pruzbul when this money is in the bank. [Regarding money received from work, see below, section d.]

[13] As above.

[14] A young man or young woman who is not supported by their father: the money they receive for their labor belongs to them. But if they are supported by their father, the Rishonim dispute whether the money belongs to their father or to them. Some Rishonim held that the money belongs to their father—see Tosafot, Bava Kamma (87b, s.v. וקתני), and Responsa of the Rashba attributed to the Ramban (siman 105), who hold that it belongs to the father; see also Responsa Rabbi Betzalel Ashkenazi (siman 35) and Responsa Shevut Yaakov (vol. 1, siman 105), and this was noted in the glosses of Rabbi Akiva Eiger (Choshen Mishpat, siman 270) and is brought in Ein HaGilayon there [Talman edition]. However, some Rishonim held that the work of their hands belongs to themselves—see Ritva, Bava Metzia (92b), and in the aforementioned Responsa Rabbi Betzalel Ashkenazi and Responsa Shevut Yaakov. According to the Rishonim who held that the work of their hands belongs to themselves, if they have money from work deposited in the bank, or if they lent to others, they must make a pruzbul.

[15] In accordance with what was explained above in the introduction, that women must make a pruzbul.

[16] See Minchat Chinuch (mitzvah 84), what he wrote about this. See also Responsa Binyan Shlomo (Choshen Mishpat, siman 1), where he discusses this.

[17] See Chidushei Rabbi Akiva Eiger (Gittin 32a), what he wrote about this, and also Noda BiYehudah (Tinyana, Yoreh De’ah 147) and Machaneh Ephraim (Laws of Agents, siman 7).

[18] This is obvious, for since she has no money of her own [such as money from before her marriage or an inheritance she inherited, which funds are defined as nichsei melog (as explained in Even HaEzer, siman 85), where the principal is hers and the fruits are his; if these funds are deposited in the bank, a pruzbul is required, as will be explained below, section h], she need not make a pruzbul, and this is obvious.

[19] Since she has a separate bank account with her husband’s consent, generally, by default, the money there belongs to the woman, and therefore she must make a pruzbul.

[20] Work that it is not so common for women to do would, simply speaking, not have the status of “surplus” [additional labor] that belongs to the husband, but rather the status of surplus produced through strain. In Ketubot (66), the Tannaim dispute to whom surplus produced through strain belongs: according to the first Tanna it belongs to her husband, and according to Rabbi Akiva to herself. In practice—the view of Rabbeinu Chananel is that the halachah follows Rabbi Akiva, that surplus produced through strain belongs to the woman; whereas the view of Rav Hai Gaon (cited in the Rif and Rosh there) and the Rambam (chapter 21 of Ishut) is that the halachah follows the first Tanna, that surplus produced through strain belongs to the husband. However, Rav Hai Gaon’s view (see Tur and Beit Yosef, Even HaEzer, siman 80) is that when the work of her hands that came from surplus through strain belongs to her husband, this refers to money she earned by straining herself to increase her work [such as at night, when it is not customary for people to engage in work]; but if she strained herself to do several tasks at once, the surplus belongs to herself and not to her husband.

However, the Rambam’s view is that even if she performed several tasks at once, everything belongs to her husband. It appears that nurses who work a night shift should be judged as surplus produced through strain.

In Shulchan Aruch (Even HaEzer, siman 80, se’if 1), he rules like the Rambam that surplus produced through strain belongs to her husband. However, the Bach (there) wrote that the custom is to follow Rabbeinu Chananel, not to take surplus produced through strain from the woman, and so ruled the Chelkat Mechokek and the Beit Shmuel (there) in practice, and so the Beit Meir there also held. However, the Chazon Ish (Even HaEzer, siman 70, se’if katan 5) wrote in practice that we follow the Shulchan Aruch, and there is no clear custom in this matter like the Bach; see there.

According to the opinions that it belongs to her, one must discuss whether its status is like nichsei melog, whose fruits belong to the husband, or whether it belongs to her entirely; the poskim dispute this. The Beit Shmuel (there, se’if katan 2) proved from the words of Tosafot (Ketubot 59) that its status is like nichsei melog, whose fruits belong to the husband