Assisting in Collection Through Secular Courts

Shalom.

A secular person sued his friend in a state court with the defendant’s consent. The court ruled that the defendant must pay a certain amount. Is it permitted to help the plaintiff collect this debt?

Shalom u’vracha.

It is necessary to clarify whether this debt exists according to Torah law as well. The fact that it was done with mutual consent in a state court does not in itself constitute “kiblu aleihem” (that they halachically accepted this ruling upon themselves).

Shulchan Aruch, Choshen Mishpat 26:1 states that it is forbidden to be judged before non-Jewish courts (and all the more so before Jews who judge according to non-Jewish laws), even if both litigants agreed. Regarding whether the ruling takes effect post factum, the Sma and the Taz disagree in se’if 3 about a case where they made a kinyan (formal acquisition) to go be judged according to non-Jewish law: although it is certainly forbidden to go to them for judgment, in a Jewish beit din they might be required to rule according to those non-Jewish laws, because their property became obligated through this kinyan (in a case where it is not merely a “kinyan devarim”), or perhaps the kinyan does not take effect at all. One must examine whether going to a secular court by mutual consent constitutes such a kinyan. The Rema in se’if 1 brings two opinions regarding someone who refused to be judged in a Jewish court and was obligated by the secular courts, and then wants to return and be judged in a Jewish court—whether we accept him or not. The Rema rules mainly that we do not accept him. The Netivot HaMishpat cites two reasons from the Tumim: either based on the law of “kiblu alaihu” (they accepted upon themselves a relative or disqualified judge, which can still be valid), or as a penalty (knas). A practical difference between these reasons is if the secular courts took a bribe: if it is because of “kiblu alaihu”, then even with a relative or disqualified judge the ruling can be nullified through bribery; but if it is due to a penalty, then even if they took a bribe, we still penalize. Seemingly, there is another practical difference between these reasons regarding whether “kiblu alaihu” is effective for secular courts at all: one could say that “kiblu alaihu” only works for a shepherd or layman who judges according to his understanding and not by a fixed legal system, whereas a legal system that stands in contradiction to the Torah’s laws cannot be subject to “kiblu alaihu”, in line with the words of the Taz in se’if 3. The Netivot rules mainly like the reason of penalty, and this also appears from Kesef HaKedoshim; accordingly, it can be said that “kiblu alaihu” does not work regarding the courts of non-Jews.